




We examine access to, use of, and participation in decisions on improved water supply 
in the Volta basin of Ghana, one of the first countries to introduce a community-based 
approach to rural water supply on a large scale. While 71 percent of the households 
interviewed have access to improved water, 43 percent of these continue to use unsafe sources 
as their main domestic water source. Our results indicate that quality perceptions and 
opportunity costs play an important role in households’ choice of water source. The effect of 
prices and income levels on this choice differs according to the pricing system used. Given 
that supply characteristics such as the location and pricing system affect household decisions 
to use the improved source, households may try to influence these characteristics in their favor 
during the community decision-making process for the improved source. However, less than 
40 percent of the households interviewed participated in decisions on location or technology. 
We argue that the decision whether to participate depends on three main factors: (i) the 
household’s bargaining power, (ii) the potential benefits from influencing outcomes, and (iii) 
the cost of participation, (mainly opportunity cost of time). Our results indicate that bargaining 
power matters more than potential benefits. Moreover, we find an extremes effect: the poorest, 
uneducated and the richest, highly educated segments of the community are more likely to 
participate in decision-making for improved domestic water supply than the middle class. We 
conclude with policy implications and needs for further research. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the goals of the international community stated in the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration is to reduce by half the population with no access to safe water by 2015. According 
to WHO/UNICEF (2000) 1.1 billion people lack access to improved water supply.
3 Due to 
population growth and rapid urbanization this number will likely rise rapidly in the coming years 
unless serious measures are undertaken to stem the tide. Massive investments in supply 
infrastructure are required as well as reforms in the operation and maintenance of supply systems 
to increase efficiency. In the past, water supply was typically planned and operated by the central 
government or a national authority. Budget constraints, low revenues, and shortfalls in operation 
and maintenance have resulted in insufficient expansion of the system and gradual degradation of 
service at the same time that water demands increased and scarcity worsened. This development 
has led to the recognition that water should no longer be seen as a public good only, but also as an 
economic good. It is now widely accepted that households should pay for improved water, and 
revenues should cover at least the operation and maintenance cost. Furthermore, a withdrawal of 
the central government from supplying water and operating the system, and the introduction of 
public-private partnerships in water supply have been shown to help relieve budget constraints 
                                                 
1 Paper presented at the IFPRI-convened “Panel on Water Policy and Agricultural Production at the Global and River 
Basin Levels,” of the International Association of Agricultural Economists (IAAE) in Durban, South Africa, August 
2003. 
2 First authorship is not assigned. We would like to thank Yaw Asare, who made a major contribution to the survey 
work. Funding for this research was provided by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) 
and the Robert Bosch Foundation. 
3 Along with the WHO/UNICEF (2000) definition the following technologies are considered “improved”: household 
connection, public standpipe, borehole, protected dug well, protected spring, and rainwater collection. As “not 
improved” are considered: unprotected well, unprotected spring, vendor-provided water, bottled water (because of 
limitations concerning the potential quantity of supplied water, not the quality) and tanker truck provision of water.  
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and improve supply efficiency, if implemented appropriately. For rural areas, community 
management of water resources under government guidance has been advocated (Brookshire et 
al. 1993; Atlaf et al. 1993; Munasinghe 1992).  
This paper addresses these issues in the context of rural water supply in the Volta River 
Basin in Ghana, which introduced community water management in rural areas in the early 1990s 
(Asante et al. 2002). The assessment is based on data collected through household and 
community surveys in the Ghanaian Volta basin.
4 The paper examines access to improved water 
sources in rural communities in the basin as well as the factors that determine households’ 
decisions in using a specific water source. Access to improved water does not automatically 
translate into use by all households. Particularly in rural areas, improved water facilities are often 
underutilized or abandoned while households choose to continue the use of traditional water 
sources (Mu et al. 1990). The decision to use a particular water source is influenced by prices and 
income constraints as well as preferences, knowledge, and perceptions about water quality 
differences. The effect of different pricing systems, the role of awareness about water quality, and 
the potential of exclusion of poor households from using improved sources where water is 
distributed at a cost are some of the policy-relevant issues addressed in this paper.  
Moreover, the participatory approach to water supply adopted in Ghana and elsewhere 
implies that some of the factors that can explain differences in use—particularly supply 
characteristics like price, location, technology, and type of payment—are themselves subject to 
the influence of community members. This leads to further research questions, including: To 
what degree do rural households participate in decision-making about improved water supply? 
And why do some households participate—thereby potentially influencing outcomes in their 
favor—while others do not? These issues are analyzed for decisions regarding the location and 
                                                 
4 A survey was conducted in 20 communities across the Volta River Basin in Ghana in 2001. In each community, 
approximately 25 households as well as a community representative were interviewed.  
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technology of the improved source. Linkages between the decision to participate and the choice 
of water source are examined explicitly.  
One of the interesting issues arising in this context is how participation differs across 
segments of the community, grouped by income or education, for example. Are the poor likely to 
be excluded, as reflected in unfavorable locations and technologies, making it less likely for them 
to use improved water sources? Contrary to the middle-class effect that has been observed 
elsewhere (Weinberger and Juetting 2002), we find what we call an extremes effect. That is, the 
poorer and less educated as well as the richer and highly educated segments of the community 
appear more likely to participate in decision-making processes for water supply than the middle 
class.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two presents a brief review of the literature on 
determinants of household water use. This is followed by an introduction to the geographical and 
socioeconomic setting of the Volta River Basin in Ghana and a description of the reform process 
for rural water supply. The next section describes household water security in terms of access, 
usage, and consumption of water.  The determinants of households’ decisions to use improved 
water sources are estimated and household participation in decisions regarding improved water 
supply as well as potential explanatory factors for differences in participation across households 
and communities are examined in the sixth section. The last section concludes and presents policy 
implications. 
 
2.  FACTORS DETERMINING DOMESTIC WATER USE 
Many of the water projects implemented over the last three decades in developing 
countries are considered failures (World Bank 1992). Experts from a variety of disciplines have 
examined factors determining success. They identified knowledge of the health benefits of  
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improved water supplies, affordability of tariffs, sensitivity by donors and the central government 
to local customs and beliefs, the ability to operate and maintain water systems by the local 
population, as well as community participation and local involvement in design and management 
as important factors for rural people to use improved water sources (Brookshire et al. 1993). 
Regarding the supply side, economic studies have emphasized the importance of 
improving project identification, design and construction, of understanding the institutions 
providing water and their tendency towards selecting capital-intensive enterprises and neglecting 
maintenance schemes, and of establishing strategic links between the water investment sector and 
other macroeconomic policies (Howe and Dixon 1993; Rogers et al. 1993).  
On the demand side, the economic literature focuses on the valuation by households of 
different water sources and the analysis of determinants of water demand. Several studies 
conducted in developing countries over the past ten years have tried to evaluate the willingness to 
pay (WTP) for improved water supply by applying the contingent valuation approach 
(Whittington et al. 1990, 1991; Atlaf et al 1993, 1994; Briscoe et al. 1990; World Bank Water 
Demand Research Team 1993). The empirical results of all these studies show that the 
willingness to pay for improved water service does not depend solely on income, but equally on 
the characteristics of both the existing and the improved supplies. Income is often not the main 
factor determining water demand. The share of income that a household is willing to pay for 
water can vary widely – from 0.5% to 10%. Moreover, income elasticities of demand for access 
to improved water services have been estimated to be very low, for example, 0.15 in Brazil, 0.14 
in India, 0.07 in Zimbabwe (World Bank Water Demand Research Team 1993). Furthermore, 
empirical analysis showed that more educated households are willing to pay more for improved 
water supplies; and that gender was a statistically significant determinant in WTP for improved  
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water supply. However, the direction of the relationship between gender and WTP depends on the 
specific cultural context.  
A second group of factors influencing demand for improved water supply relate to the 
characteristics of the existing water source versus those of the improved supply, including the 
cost (both financial and opportunity cost of time for collecting water), the quality, and the 
reliability of supply. A third set of characteristics influencing households’ WTP relates to their 
attitude towards government water supply policy and their sense of entitlement to government 
service (World Bank Water Demand Research Team 1993). A more recent study looked at 
household water demand for improved piped water services in Kathmandu, Nepal (Whittington 
et.al. 2002).  Here respondents were asked how they would vote given the choice between their 
existing water supply situation and an improved water service provided by a private operator. The 
study showed that households’ willingness to pay for improved water services was much higher 
than existing water bills.  
Using a discrete choice model of household water source decisions, Mu et al. (1990) 
emphasize the heterogeneous good characteristics of water in less developed countries. They 
argue that unavailability and bad quality of data, as well as the lack of variation in prices in many 
developing countries are a major constraint to using the price-quantity approach. The authors 
therefore limit their analysis to the type of water source households choose, instead of 
considering the simultaneous choice of quantity and source. The underlying assumption is that a 
household chooses the source independently of the amount of water used. Merret (2002) criticizes 
the previous methodologies because they do not take into account the multiple uses of water and 
their relationship to multiple sourcing. He suggests that behavioral studies into the domestic 
demand for water and wastewater services in low-income countries should be based on semi-
structured interviews and incorporate the scale and composition of use and reuse and their  
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relation to the quality of water.  Madanat and Humplick (1993) actually implement an approach 
that takes Merret’s suggested direction, considering the conditional demand for water by 
households according to each specific use within a multiple-stage-analysis framework, assuming 
that households only use one source for each specific use. This assumption is problematic, 
however. In the household survey for Ghana, for example, the majority of households use several 
sources for one activity, and water from one source is typically used for several activities. 
Asante et al. (2002) analyze the access to different types of drinking water sources and the 
choice among sources for households in the Volta Basin in Ghana. They also provide an analysis 
of water-related diseases and relate migration to water access in the region. Their study finds that 
between 25-75 percent of households in the region use improved water sources. They also find a 
higher probability of out-migration in communities with scarce, low-quality drinking water 
sources and that education and household income are explanatory factors for households using 
improved water sources. However, due to lack of data, their analysis does not consider costs 
incurred by households using improved water sources, a possible omitted variable bias in their 
analysis. 
The majority of the above mentioned studies do not consider the fact that households 
facing different pricing systems are subject to different decision processes. Merret (2002), for 
example, notes about the maximum willingness-to-pay approach that “…it lacks any clear 
meaning for a respondent who faces a volumetric pricing tariff for the scenario project. [The 
maximum willingness to pay]… can have a practical significance only when it applies, for 
example, to a monthly fixed charge for access to a water supply. [...] the results should be 
represented as that fixed charge and not as a unit price, for the only sense attributable to the latter 
in this case is the statistical ratio of the fixed charge to the unknown volume of water used, a ratio 
the user never computes.” Related to this is the fact that the pricing system has an important  
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impact on decision-making and on water use choices. For example, a price charged per unit of 
water consumed implies a marginal price of water that is positive, while a flat rate charged once 
per season or year implies a marginal price of zero and can be considered more like an investment 
decision. Our study will consider these issues by explicitly comparing determinants of the choice 
of water source for different pricing systems. 
Thus, the literature highlights the nature of the financing process and considers 
consumers’ welfare improvement as a function of their valuation of improved water only. The 
problem of embeddedness of economic action and social structure (Granovetter 1985) is not 
addressed. Structures of social relations determine who participates in a project and how the 
benefits of the project are distributed. Community management of improved water resources is 
based on the assumption that citizen involvement in planning decisions will foster both efficiency 
and equity. Lovei and Whittington (1993) point out that community participation in decisions and 
local control of water utilities is desired, in order to avoid rent-extracting behavior of agents that 
are able to gain control of water sources, restrict supply to users, and raise the water price. Njoh 
(2002) underscores the importance of a participatory approach in water projects to avoid 
problems such as a paternalistic posture of authorities, a prescriptive role of the state, selective 
participation, intra/inter-group conflicts, gate-keeping by leaders, excessive pressures for 
immediate results, and implementation problems because of lack of knowledge about belief 
systems. Rigorous analysis of who in the community actually participates in such projects is, 
however, missing. Weinberger and Juetting (2002) provide a theoretical framework to identify 
the determinants of participation. Their empirical analysis of two field sites in Chad and Kashmir 
suggests a “middle-class effect“ in terms of income characteristics and a positive effect of 
membership in other informal groups, but renders inconclusive outcomes for the effect of  
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bargaining power of individuals.
5 However, their “middle-class effect” analysis, based on two 
separate regressions, needs further study. In our analysis below we test for the middle-class effect 
in a single regression. Furthermore, we directly link the participation decision to the water use 
decision. 
 
3. GEOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC, AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF THE STUDY 
SITE 
THE VOLTA BASIN  
The Volta basin covers an area of about 400,000 km² and connects six riparian 
countries—Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Togo and small parts of Côte d’Ivoire, Benin and Mali.  
The basin is of particular importance for Ghana as it drains about three quarters of the country 
through its main tributaries, the Black Volta, the White Volta, the Oti and the Lower Volta with 
the latter referring to the river downstream of the confluence of the Black and the White Volta 
(Andreini et al. 2000, see also Map 1).  A major characteristic of the basin is the high rainfall 
variability in the upland areas with frequent droughts and seasonal water shortages and thus 
problems of water security.  In 1964 the Akosombo Dam was constructed at the Lower Volta, 
creating one of the world’s largest reservoirs with a storage capacity of 148 km³ - commonly 
known as the Volta Lake. The hydropower produced is mainly used by the Volta Aluminum 
Company (Valco) and for the electrification of the country (Andreini et al. 2000). So far irrigation 
does not play a significant role in water use within the basin. However, a substantial increase in 
irrigation development in the Bukinabe and Ghanaian part of the basin is anticipated (Edig, Engel 
and Laube 2002).  
                                                 
5 Possible correlation of several wealth measures, as well as endogeneity of the social capital variable could represent 




         Map 1--Ghana and the Volta Basin 
 
     
           Source: Asante et al. (2002) 
 
ECONOMY AND POVERTY  
Ghana has a population of about 18.9 million people (Ghana Statistical Service 2002), 
with about 10.2 million in the basin. The country’s population growth rate is about 2.5 percent 
per year. However, growth varies significantly by region due to differences in fertility and 
migration. In the Upper Eastern and Upper Western Region population growth has declined 
significantly (from ~2.5 to ~1.4 percent per year between 1984 and 2000), whereas more urban 
areas like Greater Accra experience rapid population increase, more than 4 percent annually (3.3 
in 1984), revealing a concentration in the peri-urban and urban areas in southern Ghana (Ghana  
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Statistical Service 2000a). However, the greater part of Ghana’s population lives in rural areas 
(about 56 percent in 2000).
6  
In 2001, agriculture accounted for about 39.6 percent of total GDP, and the industrial and 
service sectors, for 27.4 percent and 33 percent, respectively (ISSER 2003). Electricity and water 
account for 2.8 percent (in 2001) of industrial GDP (ISSER 2003). Per capita GNP in 2001 was 
US$390.  
Poverty alleviation is one of the major challenges in Ghana and particularly in the Volta 
basin. According to the Ghana Living Standard Measurement survey of 1998-1999 the percentage 
of people below the upper poverty line declined by 12 percent over the previous 7 years to 40 
percent.
7 The decline in poverty is concentrated in Accra and forested localities in the southwest 
of Ghana – both located outside the basin. In most of the remaining areas, both urban and rural, 
poverty fell only very modestly, and in the urban and rural Savannah (which covers the main part 
of the basin) the proportion of the population defined as poor increased during the period. The 
incidence of extreme poverty—defined as households whose standard of living is insufficient to 
meet their basic nutritional needs even if they devoted their entire consumption budget to food—
is more than 25 (26.8) percent in Ghana. The Savannah zone has the largest share of rural 
population living in extreme poverty, about 59 percent in 1998/99 (Ghana Statistical Service 
2000b).  
                                                 
6 A rural area is defined to have a population of less than 5000 inhabitants. 
7 Poverty has various dimensions: consumption poverty, lack of access to services and limited human development. 
Here, the poverty line is defined on a consumption requirement basis. It is differentiated between a lower poverty 
line (“extreme poverty”) of 700,000 Cedis per adult and year ( ~US$262)—based on what is needed, to meet the 
nutritional requirements of household members—and the upper poverty line which is fixed at 900,000 Cedis per 
adult and year (~ US$337) and incorporates both essential food and non- food consumption. The statistics given here 




Vulnerability to household water insecurity is a widespread problem in the basin, and 
water insecurity is closely linked to poverty. Water insecurity is based on inadequate water access 
and usage, particularly in the dry season when some of the water sources, e.g. wells, dry up. In 
addition to quantity, water of sufficient quality is an essential element for human development 
and poverty reduction, and a precondition for effective primary health care. In the Volta Basin a 
close relation between water and health can be observed. Major water-related diseases are 
malaria, diarrhea, schistosomiasis or billharzia, and guinea worm. They are endemic in most 
parts, and children are most vulnerable to these diseases. In terms of outpatient clinic attendance, 
malaria and diarrhea are the most frequent diseases. Malaria is also the major cause of mortality, 
especially among children. 
Lack of access to safe drinking water is significant in the basin region, even if sufficient 
resources are available. A large share of the basin population relies on unimproved or unreliable 
water sources such as unprotected shallow wells, vendors, ponds, lakes, and rivers. These sources 
not only pose significant health risks, but are also costly to reach. Time and energy spent for 
fetching water could be used more efficiently, for example, for subsistence agriculture or 
schooling.  In addition to the opportunity cost of time, some (mostly poor urban) households face 
additional costs from purchasing water from street vendors.  Households with improved water 
access receive water either through piped supply of treated water sources (in house/outside tap) or 
have access to wells with pumps (mainly boreholes). Although the government policy is to 
provide domestic water to all consumers in urban areas and to around 90 percent of rural 
households by 2020, it is unlikely that this goal will be reached. According to a national water 
supply and sanitation survey conducted in 1993, the supply of potable water only reached about 
76 percent of the urban and 46 percent of the rural population.   
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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN GHANA’S WATER SECTOR 
In the past, the Ghana Water and Sewage Cooperation (GWSC) had the mandate to 
provide an adequate supply of domestic water to the country’s rural and urban population. 
Recognizing the GWSC’s failure to fulfill this mandate, the Ghanaian government introduced—
as part of its general decentralization policy for the public sector—institutional reforms in the 
domestic water sector, which are currently under implementation. As part of this reform process 
the urban and rural domestic water sectors were separated.  In 1994, the government established 
the Community Water and Sanitation Project (CWSP) by launching the National Community 
Water and Sanitation Program (NCWSP). Initially the CWSP was part of GWSC, but later was 
turned into an autonomous institution known as the “Community Water and Sanitation Agency 
(CWSA)”, responsible for rural drinking water supply and facilitating the implementation of the 
national community and sanitation strategy (established by Act 564, 1998). Urban water supply 
remained the responsibility of GWSC, which in July of 1999 was legally converted to a limited 
liability company - the Ghana Water Company Limited.
8   
REFORM OF RURAL WATER SUPPLY 
The Community Water and Sanitation Agency seeks to transfer the ownership and 
management of water and sanitation services to rural communities and small towns to increase 
the sustainability of water supply and to enhance the control of water-borne diseases. This 
approach involves the communities in the design, planning, and operation of the supply systems, 
as well as in the financing of the necessary investments.  Communities are also financially 
responsible for operation and maintenance. In contrast to the past this is a demand-driven 
                                                 
8 In line with the Government’s policy objectives in the domestic water sector, two additional institutions – the Water 
Resources Commission (WRC) and the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) – have been set up. The 
PURC is responsible for approving water tariffs and to ensure proper water industry practices. The WRC, on the 
other hand, is empowered to oversee the sustainable utilization of the country’s water resources and is responsible for 




approach towards the provision of basic water supply and sanitation services.  Women, who are 
mainly responsible for securing household water needs and for determining water use within the 
household, were given a central role in the design and management of the program within their 
communities. Participating communities have to contribute up to 5 percent of the total capital 
cost, as a means of registering ownership of the facility. In addition, it is expected that the 
communities are responsible for operation and maintenance costs of the facilities. In order to 
cover these costs, communities need to devise water charges, either through monthly water fees 
or through a “per-bucket” fee at the water service points. The private sector and NGOs were 
encouraged to participate in rural water supply provision, through the construction and 
maintenance of the facilities and the provision of equipment.  
The institutional arrangements for implementing the national community and sanitation 
program comprise different levels of implementing bodies. The basic unit is the village, which 
forms a gender-balanced Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) committee. This committee is in 
charge of raising the initial community contribution to construction costs, and is responsible for 
the maintenance and operation of the water and sanitation systems. The committees work in close 
coordination with the district assemblies, which form the District Water and Sanitation Teams 
(DWST) that coordinate, supervise, and promote the project developments in the communities. 
Moreover, the CWSA has Regional Offices (RWSTs) that provide technical assistance to the 
district assemblies. CWSA is the overall primary responsible body, which guides, promotes, and 
monitors project activities. One goal of the program is to ensure that there is a minimum basic 
service of water – 20 liters per capita per day - which is protected all year, within 500 meters 




Up to now, the program seems to be fairly successful and approximately 40 percent of the 
rural population is participating in the program. CWSA’s goal is to reach 85 percent of the rural 
population by 2009 (CWSA 2003). In order to foster the spread of the new supply strategy, 
CWSA also encourages NGOs to adapt their aid activities to the program and thereby to prevent 
any undermining of the policy. In addition, national and international NGOs are contracted to 
help with capacity building of local-level NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) as a 
basis for community mobilization. 
The participatory approach of the CWSP is considered to be a major key to the success of 
the program. That structures for local and community management were already in place in 
Ghana certainly favored the new rural water supply policy. A national reform in 1983 had 
included a Decentralization Act that created and empowered district assemblies, a process well 
under way by the time the CWSA started its program (WSP-AF 2002). Today it is clear that 
transferring responsibility to district or communities needs time, as the capacity to cope with 
these responsibilities needs to first be developed. As individual households are expected to 
participate in construction and management decisions, including location and technology, there 
might be a need for educational advertising to point out the benefits of improved water supply 
and participation in related decision-making to communities. Moreover, the question of 
community cash contribution to capital costs is still being debated (WSP-AF 2002). In addition, 
little is known about who in the community effectively participates in the decision-making about 
water supply. Further insights would likely help to improve program design. This will be 




4.  ACCESS, USAGE, AND COST OF IMPROVED WATER SUPPLY 
This section is based on a household water use survey carried out in the Ghanaian Volta 
basin during 2001, surveying a total of 503 households in 20 rural communities.  
Water security in the Volta basin of Ghana relates to availability and access to safe water, 
which is closely related to investment in supply infrastructure and the management of domestic 
water supply, and varies across space and time.  It also depends on the decision to use or not 
available sources of improved water, which is determined by price and income constraints as well 
as preferences, knowledge, and perceptions about water quality differences.  
ACCESS TO WATER AND ACTUAL USE PATTERNS 
Sources for domestic water supply in the basin are public pipes, boreholes, shallow wells, 
river, stream, and pond water, and rainwater. Households tend to use multiple water sources 
across seasons and for different purposes. They tend to depend on one major source, which is 
supplemented by additional sources. For example, 43.5 percent of interviewed households state 
that they use water from boreholes, but it is the major water source for only 32.5 percent (see 
Table 1). On average, households use two different sources for household water supply, which 
vary across seasons. 
Table 1--Water sources used by the sampled households 
  Sources used by the household in the 
past twelve month (in %) a/ 
Major water source used by the 
household (in %)  
Piped water in the house or 
compound 
2.6 2.6 
Public Tap /standpipe  7.6  5.4 
Private water vendor  5.4  1.4 
Handdug well  18.6  12 
Borehole 43.5  32.5 
Water from neighbors  3.0  2.2 
River, streams and ponds  57.5  42.1 
Rainwater 64.3  1.2 
Other   0.8  0.6 
TOTAL 203.3  100.0 
Note: a/More than one source could be named 




Out of the 20 communities surveyed, 15 have access to improved water supply. A 
household is defined to have access to an improved water source, if the community either has a 
borehole installed or if it is connected to the public piped system. The survey showed that 
although 71 percent of the surveyed households have access to improved water, more than half 
(59.5 percent) still rely on traditional, non-improved water sources—mainly surface water from 
river streams and ponds—as their main domestic water source. Moreover, 43 percent of 
households with access to an improved water source use unsafe water supply as their main 
domestic water source, either from hand-dug wells (43 percent), or surface sources from rivers, 
ponds, and streams (46 percent) (Table 2). 
Table 2--Access to improved water supply and major water sources used for domestic water 
needs 
 YES  NO 






 YES  NO   
Household using improved water sources 
as major water source  57.2% 42.8%   
Sources used for major water needs       
Piped water to house/compound  6.4%     
Public Tap  13.3%     
Borehole 80.3%     
      
Private Vendor    4.6%   
Handdug well    39.5%   
River, stream, pond    46.1%  96.6% 
Rainwater   2.6%  1.4% 
Other (e.g. water received from 
Neighbors)   7.2%  2.1% 
Source: GLOWA Volta field survey [2001]. 
 
The alternative water source households rely on depends on the water availability in the 
respective area. Due to higher precipitation in the southern part of the basin, for example, 
rainwater harvesting seems to be a more important alternative to borehole supplies in that region, 
whereas boreholes are more important in the northern part of the Ghanaian basin.   
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Among those households that have access to improved water supply, but continue to use 
streams and lakes as their main water source (70 cases or 20 percent of all households with 
improved access), only one fifth considers water from improved water sources (here boreholes) 
as the second most important source. The majority (60 percent out of the 70 cases) uses rainwater 
as the main alternative to surface water. Households using hand-dug wells as their main source 
(while having access to improved water supply) consider rainwater (27 percent), water from 
boreholes (22 percent), and surface water (13 percent) as their main alternative sources.  
CONSUMPTION OF WATER 
The daily average per capita water consumption for all domestic uses by the surveyed 
households is about 22 liters in the dry season and about 23 liters in the rainy season.  
Consumption differs by source of water. Three user groups can be defined along which 
consumption and expenditure patterns. User group 1 has no direct access to improved water 
supply within the community and therefore mainly relies on surface water; user group 2 has 
access, but uses non-improved water sources, such as water from shallow wells or surface water, 
as major water source for their daily water needs; and user group 3 uses improved water supply 
as main domestic water source. 
Households in group 1 consume less water per capita than households in group 3 using 
improved water supply, averaging 16 liters per capita in the dry season and 23 liters in the rainy 
season compared to 22 liters in the dry and 24 liters in the rainy season, respectively (see Figure 
1). The difference in consumption between those two user groups is only statistically significant 
in the dry season, however. This is due to the real constraints imposed on households without 
access to safe water supplies in the dry season, with declines in supply reliability and increased 
opportunity costs for securing water, while rainwater harvesting is a readily available secondary  
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source in the rainy season—85 percent of households using water from streams or ponds as main 
water source rely on rainwater as their second most important water source.  
Figure 1--Water consumption patterns for different user groups  
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Thus, households using improved water supply have more stable consumption patterns, as 
the availability of these sources – public piped water and boreholes – generally does not vary by 
season. By contrast, households relying on non-improved water sources may face seasonal water 
shortages as one dimension of household water insecurity. 
Households not only tend to combine different water sources, but also to vary their 
combination across seasons. The share of water accessed from improved water sources varies 
significantly between dry and rainy season for both user groups 2 and 3. The average share of 
water consumed from improved sources for the whole sample is 38 percent in the dry season and 
29 percent in the rainy season. Households that access improved water supply as their main  
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source for household needs (user group 3) cover 82 percent of their needs from this source in the 
dry season, but only 69 percent in the rainy season. For user group 2 the corresponding shares are 
11 percent (dry season) and 8 percent (rainy season). Thus, the increased opportunity costs of 
collecting water in the dry season leads to a greater reliance on improved water supply during that 
season.  
In addition, usage purposes vary by water source. For example, in the overall sample, 10 
percent of households that use water from boreholes for drinking and cooking do not use it for 
bathing and laundry. Moreover, 18 percent of these households supplement their drinking water 
needs from surface water sources, particularly in the rainy season and about 30 percent state that 
they also rely on water from rivers, streams, and ponds for bathing and laundry. Moreover, nearly 
half of the households that use improved water sources as major water source also collect 
rainwater for all purposes, including for drinking and cooking.  
HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES FOR WATER 
Households in Ghana face both direct and indirect costs for obtaining water. Direct costs 
are monetary costs in the form of water charges, while indirect costs include opportunity costs of 
time for fetching water from distant places and, in some cases, transportation costs. Direct 
monetary costs are mostly incurred for water from the public piped system, private vendors, most 
boreholes, and sometimes also for wells. The water tariff for the piped system is subsidized and 
much lower than vendor water. At the time of the survey piped water charges were based on an 
increasing block tariff structure composed of 2 blocks: 0-10 m³ at 990 Cedis per m³ and more 
than 10 m³ at 3,600 Cedis per m³.
9 The official tariff for water from public standpipes was 1,000 
Cedis/m³ and the monthly flat fee for water from boreholes and wells with pumps was 3,000 
Cedis per month.  
                                                 
9 The average exchange rate for 2001 was 7.139 Cedis for US$1.  
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However, tariff designs vary in communities that manage the supply system themselves 
(see Table 3). Water from public taps is usually sold by unit, for example, bucket or basin, and 
the price varies between 25-100 Cedis per volume unit. As part of the Ghanaian policy of 
decentralizing rural water supplies, communal water and sanitation committees typically manage 
the boreholes. The operation and maintenance of these boreholes is typically financed through (1) 
sales of water per bucket, (2) fixed flat rate per household – to be paid monthly or yearly, (3) 
variable contribution per household (sometimes according to the number of adults in the 
household), or (4) payment when maintenance is necessary. Water from shallow wells is typically 
free of charge for community members; in some cases per bucket/basin or monthly flat fees are 
levied. 
Table 3--Observed type of operation and maintenance fee (number of sampled 
communities) 
  Payment per bucket  Flat rate  Contributions if 
repairs arise  No contributions 
Public tap  2 -  -  - 
Borehole  3 5  5  1 
Hand dug well  1 2  -  4 
Source: GLOWA Volta field survey [2001]. 
 
 
The analysis of household expenditures for water shows a clear contrast between seasons 
and with respect to the source used (see Figure 2). Average expenditures for domestic water per 
capita and month are 4,111 Cedis in the dry season and 2,911 Cedis in the rainy season, about 1.5 
percent of per capita income. The seasonal variation of expenditures is mostly due to changes in 
water sources used and therefore costs incurred. During the rainy season, households tend to 
supplement their water needs with relatively cheap rainwater, which lowers overall expenditures. 
Moreover, in those areas where shallow wells go dry in the dry season, households need to switch 
to boreholes or water vendors as alternative—but more expensive—sources.   
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Indirect water costs, such as opportunity costs of time for fetching water from distant 
places and transportation costs  are particularly important for the 43 percent surveyed households 
that rely on surface water, without direct monetary expenditures.  While not calculated in detail 
for this study, they likely play an important role in household water source decision-making 
processes. In our analysis below we use distance from the source as a, admittedly rough, proxy of 
indirect costs.  
In summary, our descriptive analysis indicates that household water source and usage 
patterns differ significantly and seem to respond to changes in availability of alternatives and 
quality considerations for different uses. The results highlight the fact that—although the CWSP 
appears to be quite successful in providing access to improved sources for rural communities—
many households in those communities continue to use unsafe water sources, undermining  
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program targets. The determinants for household water choice will be analyzed in the following 
section. 
 
5.  WHY DO PEOPLE NOT USE IMPROVED WATER SOURCES? 
To analyze this question we conduct an econometric analysis of factors that can explain 
why some households use the improved water source and others do not. For this purpose, we 
concentrate on the sub-sample of households living in communities with access to a borehole or 
public standpipe. In general, we would expect a household to choose the improved water source if 
the expected utility from doing so exceeds the expected utility from using the non-improved 
source. Mathematically, this condition can be written as 
 E(UiI) - E(UiN) ≥ 0, 
where Uij denotes household i’s indirect utility from using source j ( {} N I j , ∈ ), I denotes 
the improved source, and N denotes the unimproved source.  
In econometric terms this relationship can be estimated as a Logit model with the 
dependent variable being a dummy reflecting whether the improved source was chosen by the 
household or not. This approach requires that the choice is mutually exclusive. Therefore, the 
focus was on the households’ main domestic water source. Since households in the sample 
usually indicated multiple water sources, even for specific uses, it was not possible to conduct a 
multinomial logit analysis specifying the type of improved and non-improved sources chosen. 
Instead we included only those communities in the sample, which had access to a borehole or a 
public tap, and where no other improved source was available and focus on the choice of 
improved versus non-improved source as main domestic water source. Table 4 provides the 
definitions of the variables used in the regression analysis and the hypothesized direction of the  
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effects. Specifically, we hypothesize the following determining factors of the household’s choice 
of water source: 
SUPPLY CHARACTERISTICS 
The supply characteristics of the water source most likely to influence decisions on 
domestic use are price and quality. We would expect that the lower the cost for using an 
improved water source the higher the likelihood that households will use it. Households will also 
choose the improved water source if costs of alternative sources are higher, if its quality is 
perceived to be better, and if the perceived quality of the alternative source is lower. The main 
alternative source with information for all households is the river. A variable (DQRIV) was 
included that captures households’ perception of river water quality. The quality of the improved 
source was not included in the regressions since there was very little variation in the dataset; 
nearly all households consider the quality of the improved water source to be good. As discussed 
in the previous section, the water cost for a source generally consists of the financial cost and the 
opportunity cost of the time spent collecting the water. To capture the opportunity cost of time, 
the difference in distance from the house to the river and to the improved source (DIFDIST) was 
included in the regressions. While the use of the river usually has no monetary cost, three 
possible price systems exist for the improved source in our sample: (i) per-bucket price, (ii) flat 
rate, and (iii) free-of-charge. In the first case, the household is charged a price for each unit of 
water extracted. Under a flat rate, the household is charged a fixed amount (on a per-household or 
per-person basis) once in a given time period and can then extract as much water as it wants. In 
some sites, no charge is applied for the water.  However, households that use the water will likely 
be charged maintenance costs if repairs become necessary. Unfortunately, information on such 
maintenance expenses was not available. The per-bucket price represents the marginal price of 
water. By contrast, the flat rate is a fixed cost that has to be invested periodically if the household  
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is to use improved water; the marginal price in this case would be zero. This difference is 
expected to have an important effect on some of the other hypothesized determinants. Therefore, 
the econometric analysis was conducted separately for these three sub-samples of the dataset.
10  
DEMAND CHARACTERISTICS 
The decision whether to use the improved source or not is also hypothesized to depend on 
the overall water demand, which is proxied by household size (NETHHSIZ). Under a per-bucket 
price system, the price per unit of water translates into higher overall water expenses for larger 
households. Given income, we would therefore expect that larger households are less likely to use 
the improved source as their major water source. The effect is quite different for a flat-rate 
system, where we would expect larger households to be more likely to use the improved source. 
For communities without direct water charges, the effect is less clear. However, if households 
under this system are charged repair costs as they arise and if those are distributed on a per 
household basis, then the effect would be similar to that in the flat rate. 
Furthermore, household income and preferences are likely to affect the demand for 
improved water. One important potential hypothesis is that poor households may not be able to 
afford to pay for improved water at the rates set by the communities. To test for this effect, we 
include an income proxy based on roof quality (ROOF).  If income restricts the ability of 
households to use the improved source, higher-income households should be more likely to use it 
than lower-income households.  
Finally, age, education, and gender of the household head (HEADAGE, DEDUC, and 
SEXHEAD) were included as proxies for preferences. The effect of age is generally ambiguous. 
On the one hand, it is hypothesized that older people prefer to keep up traditions and are therefore 
less likely to use the improved source. On the other hand, older people could be more 
                                                 
10 Communities where two or more price systems coexisted were excluded from the analysis.  
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knowledgeable about the potential health problems associated with the consumption of 
unimproved water. Similarly, we would expect more educated people to be more aware of the 
health issues and therefore more likely to use the improved source. Finally, women are 
hypothesized to care more about the health of their family, making them more likely to use the 
improved source. A second set of regressions was run including these characteristics for the 
person indicated to take decisions on water rather than the household head. 
Table 4--Definitions of variables used in econometric analysis on probability of using the 
improved source as main water source and hypothesized effects  
Variable Definition  Expected 
effect 
IMPROV  Dummy variable, =1 if main water source is an improved 
source, =0 otherwise  
Dependent 
var. 
HEADAGE  Age of household head  ? 
DEDUC  Dummy variable, =1 if household head has no formal 
education, =0 otherwise 
+ 
DIFDIST  Difference in distance between the river and the improved 
source 
+ 
PIMP  Per bucket price of improved water  - 
FCAP  Flat rate per capita  - 
DQRIV  Dummy for perceived quality of the river (0=bad, 1=good)  - 
ROOF  Roof quality dummy (=0 if mud, thatch, or wood, =1 if iron 
sheet, cement, or asbestos) 
+ 
SEXHEAD  Gender of the household head (=1 if female, =0 if male)  + 
NETHHSIZ  Size of household excluding members not living at home  - for per 
bucket 
+ for flat rate 
and zero price 
 
Table 5 presents selected descriptive statistics for the three sub-samples. The average use 
of improved water varies across the different sub-samples. Forty-two percent of households 
facing per-bucket pricing systems use the improved water source, while 89 percent of households 
in communities with flat-rate systems and 48 percent of households without direct charges use the 
improved source.  All the communities with the per-bucket price in this sample are located in the  
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southern regions (characterized by higher income and education levels than the poorer north), 
while most of the systems without a direct water charge are located in the North.  Communities 
with flat-rate systems are distributed evenly in both areas. Even though the per-bucket price 
appears much lower than the flat rate paid by households, calculations of the effective per-liter 
price of water show that paying a flat rate results in a much lower price per liter (0.22 cedis per 
liter) than a per-bucket system (3 cedis per liter). However, the flat-rate system typically requires 
payment in advance of the entire amount. The per capita consumption of improved water in the 
communities that pay a per-bucket-price is less than half the per capita consumption in the 
communities that pay a flat rate and also lower than the consumption in communities that face no 
direct water charge. This is intuitive given the lower effective price per liter and the fact that the 
marginal price of water under the flat-rate system is zero. 
Table 5--Descriptive statistics by subsample 
 Per  Bucket  Pricing     Flat  rate        Zero  Price     
  Mean Std.Dev.  Min Max  N Mean  Std.Dev. Min Max  N Mean Std.Dev.  Min  Max  N 
AVGROUP  1,80 0,58  1,04  2,67  95 2,06  0,17  1,88  2,22 53 2,15  0,41  1,56  2,59 105
CIMPPC  176,27 267,20  0,00  1080,00 95 416,39  528,90  0,00  2731,20 53 225,73 312,70  0,00 1344,00 105
DEDUC  0,64 0,48  0,00  1,00  87 0,49  0,50  0,00  1,00 53 0,37  0,49  0,00  1,00 105
DEDUCW  0,60 0,49  0,00  1,00  95 0,40  0,49  0,00  1,00 53 0,31  0,47  0,00  1,00 105
DIFDIST  -727  1684  -7500 3800  95 543  367  -303  1190  53 117  325  -700 1113  105
DISTIMP  1332  1695 70 8000 95 312  260  10 1000  53 474  253  20  1000  105
DISTRIV  604 503  55 4000 95 855  400  80 1600  53 591  190  100  1563  105
DQRIV  0,51 0,50  0,00  1,00  95 0,19  0,39  0,00  1,00 53 0,30  0,46  0,00  1,00 105
ETHNI  0,80 0,40  0,00  1,00  95 0,96  0,19  0,00  1,00 53 0,85  0,36  0,00  1,00 105
FCAP  0,00  0,00  0,00 0,00  95 60,54  65,76  9,26 489,58 53 1,60  16,44  0,00  168,42 105
FEMPROP  0,51 0,19  0,00  1,00  94 0,47  0,17  0,00  0,80 53 0,52  0,16  0,00  0,86 105
HEADAGE  49  14  22 85  94 60  15  34 105  53 49  14  1 90  105
IMPROV  0,42 0,50  0,00  1,00  95 0,89  0,32  0,00  1,00 53 0,48  0,50  0,00  1,00 105
KIDS  3,75 2,59  0,00  14,00 95 4,47  2,84  0,00  11,00 53 4,22 2,84  0,00  14,00 105
NETHHSIZ 8,82 7,16  1,00  66,00 95 11,53 5,93  1,00  37,00 53 10,34  4,32  1,00  20,00 105
PARTIC  0,52 0,51  0,00  1,00  46 0,28  0,46  0,00  1,00 46 0,20  0,40  0,00  1,00 66 
PIMP  4,32 2,19  0,00  11,11 95           0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  49 
PPCAPITA  151319 319315  18035 2842280 95 92705  121427  11747 696454 53 75301 84628  8444 742688 105
ROOF  0,89 0,31  0,00  1,00  93 0,77  0,42  0,00  1,00 53 0,63  0,49  0,00  1,00 104
SEXHEAD  0,27 0,44  0,00  1,00  94 0,06  0,23  0,00  1,00 53 0,21  0,41  0,00  1,00 105




The results of the econometric analysis are presented in Table 6. In general, the estimated 
coefficients have the expected signs, with few exceptions. The perceived quality of the river 
water consistently has a highly significant effect on the choice of water source under all three 
pricing systems. Unfortunately, the data did not permit us to analyze to what degree differences in 
perceived quality are caused by actual differences in quality as opposed to differences in 
awareness. To shed more light on what underlies quality perceptions, Table 7 presents these 
perceptions differentiated by specific characteristics of the water. Households appear to be mainly 
concerned about potential infections, followed by particles, color, and smell of the water. 
As expected, the probability of using the improved source decreases with price and 
increases with income in the communities where a positive price is charged. Interestingly, price is 
significant while income is not in the communities charging a per-unit price, and the reverse is 
true in those communities where a flat rate is charged. Thus, where households have to pay each 
time they consume water, they are more responsive to the price charged (and thus might reduce 
their quantity consumed) while income is not a constraint. This is consistent with the observation 
that water expenditures are quite low in relation to income. However, where a one-time payment 
has to be made in advance (flat rate), income becomes the constraining factor, rather than the 
actual level of the flat rate. As discussed earlier, the effective per-unit price is actually much 
lower under the flat-rate system.  The significant effect of income in these communities indicates 
that poorer households may face difficulties in making a one-time payment upfront, which could 
keep them from using the improved source. As expected, the effect of income is less clear in the 
communities applying a no-charge system. While it is only significant at the 17 percent level, its 
negative sign is a bit puzzling.  
 
28
Opportunity costs also matter. The further the distance from the river as compared to the 
distance from the improved source, the more likely the household uses the improved source. The 
effect is, however, only significant in communities charging a flat rate. 
As expected, larger households are less likely to use the improved source in communities 
charging per bucket and more likely to use it where a flat rate or no charge is applied. The effect 
is, however, not significant. For the flat rate this makes sense given the fact that the flat rate per 
capita was included in the regression. 
Age, as expected, has an ambiguous effect on the demand for an improved water source 
and is only close to significant in those communities charging a flat rate, where it has a positive 
effect. Education has the expected positive effect, but is only significant for communities 
charging a per-bucket price. This may be due to the fact that the perceived water quality already 
captures differences in awareness about health issues. Households headed by women are 
significantly more likely to use the improved source in communities charging a flat rate, while 
the effect is reversed yet insignificant in the other two cases. As indicated above, the same set of 
regressions was rerun including characteristics of the person in the household who takes domestic 
water use decisions rather than those of the household head. The results were the same for the 
per-bucket and repair charge only cases. Results changed only for the flat rate system, where the 
characteristics of the household head seemed to be more relevant. This is intuitive, given the fact 
that the decision to use improved water under a flat rate system involves a fairly high one-time 
payment, a decision, which may well be taken by the household head.  
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Table 6--Results of econometric analysis on determinants for improved water source  
 
 
Table 7--Respondents’ water quality perceptions differentiated by specific characteristics 
Proportion of households worried about different quality aspects 
 Pipe  Vendor Public 






Particles 0.01  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.09  0.10  0.35 
Color 0.00  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.06 0.03  0.35 
Smell 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.03 0.00  0.22 
Taste 0.02  0.04  0.00  0.07  0.04 0.01  0.07 
Salinity 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.06 0.01  0.00  0.01 
Fear of Infections0.00  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.07  0.04  0.44 
 
Our analysis so far only considered whether a household chooses the improved water 
source as the main source or not. In order to examine the determinants of the actual quantity of 
the improved water used, a two-stage Heckman analysis was conducted for the sub-sample of 
communities charging a per-bucket price.
11 In the first stage, the probability of a household using 
the improved source was estimated using the specification explained above. In the second stage, 
the per capita quantity of improved water used by the households was analyzed, including the 
inverted Mills ratio from the first stage to correct for selectivity bias. Variables included and their 
                                                 
11 For the other communities, quantity demanded and per-unit price are linked. This would make the analysis more 
complicated. The issue is left for future analysis. 
Per bucket pricing Flat rate Zero price
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. P-value Variable Coefficient Std.Err. P-value Variable Coefficient Std.Err. P-value
Constant 7,430 4,432 0,094 Constant -9,237 5,654 0,102 Constant 0,153 1,009 0,880
HEADAGE 0,004 0,043 0,923 HEADAGE 0,108 0,069 0,118 HEADAGE -0,008 0,018 0,630
DEDUC 2,838 1,387 0,041 DEDUC 0,856 1,275 0,502 DEDUC 0,061 0,550 0,911
DIFDIST 0,000 0,001 0,806 DIFDIST 0,005 0,002 0,050 DIFDIST 0,000 0,001 0,582
PIMP -2,076 0,586 0,000 FCAP 0,003 0,017 0,868 ... ... ...
DQRIV -3,295 1,297 0,011 DQRIV -2,694 1,306 0,039 DQRIV -2,211 0,649 0,001
ROOF 0,724 3,707 0,845 ROOF 2,895 1,739 0,096 ROOF -0,716 0,512 0,162
SEXHEAD 1,871 1,206 0,121 SEXHEAD -3,713 2,112 0,079 SEXHEAD 0,648 0,638 0,310
NETHHSIZ 0-0.065 0,154 0,674 NETHHSIZ 0,156 0,198 0,430 NETHHSIZ 0,108 0,055 0,051
Dependent variable IMPROV Dependent variable IMPROV Dependent variable IMPROV
Number of observations 85 Number of observations 53 Number of observations 104
Log likelihood function -15,27568 Log likelihood function -11,70663 Log likelihood function -57,87122
Restricted log likelihood -57,91948 Restricted log likelihood -18,71798 Restricted log likelihood -72,01036
Chi-squared 85,28761 Chi-squared 14,0227 Chi-squared 28,27829
Significance level 0 Significance level 8,12E-02 Significance level 1,96E-04
Percentage of cases predicted correctly 94,1 Percentage of cases predicted correctly 90,6 Percentage of cases predicted correctly 72,1 
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expected effects on the quantity used are given in Table 8.  The results of the second stage are 
presented in Table 9.  Two versions are reported here, one including the characteristics of the 
household head, and one including the characteristics of the person deciding on household water 
use. In general, the results are similar, with the formulation for the household head having 
slightly higher predictive power. 
The reasoning behind the variables included is similar to the one described earlier for the 
choice of water source.  As one would expect, the price per bucket has a highly significant 
negative effect on the quantity of improved water consumed.  Perceived quality of river water is 
also significant. We would expect that distance to the improved source and the river decreases 
and increases the quantity of improved water demanded, respectively. The results indicate, 
however, that these effects are insignificant, as is the income effect.  These results are in line with 
our earlier results for the probability of using improved water in communities charging per bucket 
of water used. Education of the household head has a significant positive effect on the quantity of 
improved water demanded, while the level of education of the person taking decisions on 
domestic water use is less significant. Gender and household size have the expected signs, but are 
not significant. The proportion of children in total household size was included to capture two 
possible effects. On the one hand, children tend to consume less than adults. On the other hand, 
health effects of consuming unimproved water may be more severe for children. Since these two 
effects are counteracting each other, it is not surprising that the results show an insignificant 
overall effect.  
It is likely that there are correlation problems due to the inclusion of similar variables in 
the first and second stage. It is all the more interesting, however, that the strong effect of quality 
perceptions and price prevails.  
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Table 8--Variables included in econometric analysis on quantity of improved water 
demanded and expected effects 
Variable Definition  Expected 
effect 
CIMPPC  Per capita consumption of improved water  Dependent 
var. 
KIDPROP  Proportion of children below the age of 18 in NETHHSIZ  ? 
DEDUC  Dummy variable, =1 if household head has no formal education, 
=0 otherwise 
+ 
DEDUCW  Dummy variable, =1 if person indicated to take decisions on 
water in household has no formal education, =0 otherwise 
+ 
DISTRIV  Distance to the river  + 
DISTIMP  Distance to improved water source  - 
PIMP  Per bucket price of improved water  - 
DQRIV  Dummy for perceived quality of the river (0=bad, 1=good)  - 
ROOF  Roof quality dummy (=0 if mud, thatch, or wood, =1 if iron 
sheet, cement, or asbestos)  
+ 
SEXHEAD  Gender of the household head (=1 if female, =0 if male)  + 
SEXWAT  Gender of person indicated to take decisions on water in 
household (=1 if female, =0 if male) 
+ 
NETHHSIZ  Size of household excluding members not living at home  - 




Table 9--Results of econometric analysis on quantity of improved water demanded 
(Heckman model, second stage) 
a) including characteristics of person taking 
decisions on water 
b) including characteristics of household 
head 
Variable  Coeff. Std.Err. P-value  Variable  Coeff. Std.Err.  P-value 
Constant  532.830 132.358  0.000  Constant  497.571 129.225  0.000 
KIDPROP  1.210 1.467  0.412  KIDPROP  1.538 1.449 0.292 
DEDUCW  60.324 56.550  0.290  DEDUC  117.504 59.481  0.052 
DISTRIV  -0.006 0.051  0.901  DISTRIV  0.000 0.050 0.993 
DISTIMP  -0.001 0.022  0.980  DISTIMP  -0.001 0.022  0.977 
PIMP11  -56.823 15.456  0.000  PIMP11  -56.585 15.458  0.001 
DQRIV2  108.155 61.102  0.081  DQRIV2  -119.089 60.090  0.051 
ROOF  5.289 94.126  0.955  ROOF  -26.417 93.782  0.779 
SEXWAT  32.714 54.040  0.547  SEXHEAD  79.930 62.345  0.204 
NETHHSIZ  -18.031 14.516  0.218  NETHHSIZ  -16.506 14.140  0.247 
IMR  91.982 64.412  0.158  IMR  105.113 62.048  0.095 
            
Dependent variable    CIMPPC  Dependent variable    CIMPPC 
Number of observations    85  Number of observations    85 
R-squared     0.396119  R-squared     0.419888 
Adjusted R-squared    0.31451  Adjusted R-squared    0.34149 
Significance level    0.00  Significance level    0.00 
 
 
6.  WHO PARTICIPATES IN DECISION-MAKING ON IMPROVED WATER SUPPLY 
AND WHY? 
Our results have indicated that supply characteristics matter in a household’s decision to 
use an improved water source. Given the participatory approach adopted by CWSA, the question 
arises who in the community actually participates in decisions regarding these characteristics and 
why. To address this question additional analyses were carried out.  
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Out of the 355 households interviewed with access to improved water supply, 287 
households answered the question whether they participated in the location and design of the 
improved water source. However, 61 percent of these households stated that they did not 
participate at all; 28 percent participated in the selection of the location; 9 percent in the selection  
 
33
of the technology (for example, type of pump), and 22 percent said that they participated in both 
decisions (see Table 10).  























  Public tap  23  15  7  4  49 
  Borehole  153  65  2  18  238 
 
 
At the same time, there appeared to be quite a strong sense of communal ownership 
regarding the public water source. When asked ‘Who in your opinion is owning the public supply 
facilities?’ the most frequent answer was ‘the community’.  Only few respondents considered the  
Ghana Water Company or the Water and Sanitation committee itself to be the owner. Most 
households understood the concept behind the Water and Sanitation committees and felt well 
represented, including the ability to monitor decisions taken by the committee. Furthermore, 
about half of the households with access to improved water supply stated that they contribute 
financially to the operation and maintenance of the water supply facilities. Seventy percent of 
these consider the community itself (rather than e.g. GWCL, CWSA or any NGO) to be the 
decision-making organization for cost recovery within the community. 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Regarding the determinants of participation in decisions on the location and technology of 
the improved water source, we would expect a household to participate if the expected benefits 
from participation exceed the costs. The definitions of variables included in the analysis and the 
expected signs are presented in Table 11.  
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Expected benefits from participation 
a) Potential benefits from influencing outcomes: We expect that a household is more 
likely to participate in decisions on improved water supply the higher its potential benefits in case 
it can influence outcomes (location, technology) in its favor. These are, for example, higher the 
more likely the household will actually use the improved source later on. Of course, the 
likelihood of using the improved source is endogenous. We include the predicted value from our 
earlier regressions (APROP) as an explanatory variable here. Potential benefits also depend on 
how high the household actually values the use of the improved water. For example, women may 
not only be more likely to end up using the improved source, but they may also value the positive 
health impacts higher than men. 
b) Bargaining power: Even if a household is likely to use the improved source later on and 
values its use highly, it may decide not to participate in meetings on the issue if it is not likely to 
have an actual impact on decision-making.  In other words, participation does not automatically 
imply having an influence over the actual location or technology chosen due to differences in 
bargaining power across households (Weinberger and Juetting, 2002). We include the following 
proxies for bargaining power: education, income, age, and gender of the person taking decisions 
on water, ethnicity, as well as average group membership in the community.
12 We hypothesize 
that more educated and higher-income members of the community have more bargaining power 
and are thus more likely to participate in decision-making about improved water supply. We also 
expect older, male community members to be more respected in the traditional Ghanaian 
communities and therefore to be more likely to participate as compared to younger, female 
members. A further hypothesis is that bargaining power, and thus the probability of participation, 
                                                 
12 Including the characteristics of the household head instead did not change the results in qualitative terms, but 
reduced the significance level somewhat. This may be due to the correlation with the predicted probability of using 
the improved source, which was based on household head characteristics.  
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is higher if the household belongs to the dominant ethnic group in the community. Finally, 
relative bargaining power depends on how many other members of the community are expected 
to participate as well. To capture this effect, we follow the literature on social capital and include 
the average number of groups that the people living in a particular community are members of 
(AVGROUP) as a further explanatory variable. The hypothesis is that the larger this number, the 
more people the household expects to appear at the decision-making meeting and thus the lower 
its own chances to influence the outcome in its favor. Thus, the expected effect on participation is 
negative. 
Expected costs of participation  
Participation is associated with opportunity costs. Unfortunately, exact data on 
households’ opportunity costs of time were not available for our analysis. One proxy for 
opportunity costs could be the proportion of females in total household size, the idea being that 
women may be perceived to have lower opportunity costs.
13 We also hypothesize that opportunity 
costs are related to education and possibly income. Illiterate, poor people (particularly the 
landless) operating at the subsistence limit are usually considered to have very high opportunity 
costs. Opportunity costs tend to be lower for middle-income households. Rich, highly educated 
people may have high or low opportunity costs. They may have employees farming on their land, 
reducing their own opportunity costs; but they may also work off-farm with potentially high 
opportunity costs. Thus, opportunity costs may decrease monotonically with income and 
education or may follow a U-shape. Correspondingly, the opportunity cost effect is hypothesized 
to lead to an increasing or inverted U-shaped effect of income and education on participation.  
                                                 
13 We do not intend to say that women have actually lower opportunity costs, but rather that they may be perceived to 
have lower opportunity costs in Ghanaian communities.  
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Table 11--Variables included in econometric analysis of determinants of participation in 
decisions on improved water supply and expected effects 
Variable Definition  Expected  effect 
PARTIC  Dummy variable, =1 if household member participated 
in decisionmaking over location or technique of 
improved source, =0 otherwise 
Dependent var. 
HEADAGE  Age of household head  + 
EDUW0  Dummy variable, =1 if person indicated to take 
decisions on water in household has no formal 
education, =0 otherwise 
? 
(+ opportunity cost 
effect, 
- bargaining power 
effect) 
EDUW2  Dummy variable, =1 if person indicated to take 
decisions on water in household has secondary 
education or more, =0 otherwise 
? 
(? opportunity cost 
effect, 
+ bargaining power 
effect) 
SEXWAT  Gender of person indicated to take decisions on water in 
household (=1 if female, =0 if male) 
?  
(+ potential benefits 
effect, 
- bargaining power 
effect) 
FEMPROP  Proportion of females in NETHHSIZ  + 
APROP  Predicted probability of using the improved water 
source as main water source 
+ 
HIGH20  Dummy variable, =1 if household belongs to top 20 
percent in the sample in terms of per capita 
expenditures, =0 otherwise 
? 
(? opportunity cost 
effect, 
+ bargaining power 
effect) 
LOW20  Dummy variable, =1 if household belongs to lowest 20 
percent in the sample in terms of per capita 
expenditures, =0 otherwise 
? 
(+ opportunity cost 
effect, 
- bargaining power 
effect) 
PPCAPITA  Per capita expenditures  + 
AVGROUP  Average number of groups in which people participate 
in the  community that the household belongs to 
- 
ETHNI  Dummy variable, =1 if household belongs to main 




The results of the econometric analysis are presented in Table 12. Two pairs of 
regressions are reported. First, regressions are reported for a subset including only communities 
where a water charge was applied (per bucket or flat rate), and then for the full sample including 
all three sub-samples from our earlier analysis (per bucket, flat rate, and repair costs only). This 
was done because we feel that our knowledge about the latter price system is somewhat limited 
due to the fact that information on ex post payments for maintenance costs was not available. 
Second, for each sample two versions of income variables were used: (i) a linear per capita 
expenditure variable (PPCAPITA), and (ii) dummy variables for the highest and lowest income 
quintiles of the population.
14 
In general the results are quite robust to specification, but tend to yield more significant 
effects when the sample is reduced to communities applying a water charge. The ethnicity 
variable could not be included in the smaller sample regressions due to a lack of variation. The 
results for the other variables, however, do not change when the ethnicity variable is also 
excluded from the full sample regression. The analysis yields several interesting results. 
First, the results indicate that bargaining effects seem to be more significant than the 
effect of potential benefits. Specifically, the predicted probability of using the improved source 
later on has the expected positive effect on participation, but is insignificant. Being female has a 
significant negative effect in three of the four specifications, indicating that the bargaining effect 
dominates the potential benefit effect. Age has a consistently significant effect, although its 
negative sign is somewhat puzzling. One potential explanation is that younger people are more 
easily interested in the supply of new water sources. Ethnicity has the expected effect, but is not 
significant. The average group membership in the community, used as a proxy for others’ 
                                                 
14 Including a squared term of PPCAPITA was not feasible due to a strong correlation with the variable itself. Other 
versions of dummies (e.g. highest and lowest quarter) were tried, but showed less significant effects. The results 
discussed in what follows seem to thus hold only for the extreme income quintiles.  
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expected participation and thus own relative bargaining power, has the hypothesized negative 
effect and is highly significant in the reduced sample regressions. Where per capita income is 
included the effect is significant and positive, which is also consistent with bargaining power 
being very important. 
The proportion of females as a proxy for opportunity costs shows the expected sign, but is 
not significant. As we have argued earlier, income and education can influence both bargaining 
power (with an expected positive effect) and opportunity cost (leading to an expected positive or 
inverted U-shaped effect on participation).
15 Our results indicate very consistently that education 
has what we call an extremes effect as opposed to the middle-class effect found by Weinberger 
and Juetting (2002). The effect is significant and very robust to changes in specification. It 
indicates that persons with high education (secondary or higher) as well as those with no 
education participate more than those with medium education levels. A similar effect is found for 
income. Rich households (highest quintile in terms of per capita expenditures) and very poor 
households (belonging to the lowest 20 percent) are both more likely to participate, although the 
effect of poor households is generally smaller and only significant in the reduced-sample 
regression. For highly educated and the richest members of the community the effect is consistent 
with the idea that these members have high bargaining power. Those members have very high 
chances to actually influence community decision-making in their favor and therefore participate. 
The effect is also consistent with the consideration of opportunity costs if these are relatively low 
for richer segments of the community.
16 For middle-income households with medium education 
chances are that they cannot compete in terms of bargaining power with the rich and highly 
                                                 
15 Of course, per capita expenditures (our measure of income) are potentially endogenous and could depend on 
education levels. In our sample, however, the correlation was limited. For example, excluding the income proxies to 
run the reduced form did not affect the results on education and other variables. 
16 There may also be additional social reasons such as the custom for community elites to always attend any 
important meeting.  
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educated. As a consequence, the ‘middle class’ is less likely to participate. The result that the 
poor are relatively likely to participate is, however, somewhat puzzling. Why do the poor and 
uneducated participate despite having little bargaining power and high opportunity costs? A 
possible explanation is the following. Participation by poor segments of the community could be 
demand-driven. Programs like CWSA often strongly emphasize the need to include the poor. If 
government officials and/or community leaders could be successful in getting the poor to attend, 
potentially by providing incentives like free meals
17 or simply persuasion, this would explain the 
participation of the poor, whether their inclusion implies real bargaining power or not. Of course, 
high opportunity costs may prevent this from happening. In this regard it is important to note that 
the decision-making process considered—namely the choice of technology and location of the 
water source—does not require a large number of regular meetings. Rather this is a case of a 
single or perhaps a few meetings. In this sense, opportunity costs are likely to play less of a role 
in a household’s decision to participate or not than if the decision was to join a group meeting 
regularly, as was the case, for example, in the study of Weinberger and Juetting (2002). The idea 
that opportunity costs play less of a role in our case is also consistent with the high participation 
of the high-income households. 
It should also be stressed that average incomes in our sample are quite low. Thus, our 
‘middle class’ is still poor by most standards. This may also explain why we get different results 
from Weinberger and Juetting. Clearly, more research is needed before generalizing these 
outcomes. 
                                                 
17 Unfortunately, information was not available whether such incentives were provided in the cases studied here.  
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Table 12--Results of econometric analysis on determinants of participation in decisions on 
improved water supply 
 
a) Including sub-sample of per bucket and flat rate communities only 
1) with income class dummy      2) with per capita income   
               
Variable  Coeff. Std.Err.  P-value   Variable Coeff. Std.Err. P-value 
Constant  17.606 6.902  0.011    Constant  12.457 6.080  0.041 
HEADAGE  -0.082 0.036  0.025    HEADAGE  -0.062 0.031  0.042 
EDUW0  3.030 1.139  0.008    EDUW0  2.555 1.003  0.011 
EDUW2  4.016 2.249  0.074    EDUW2  2.731 1.814  0.132 
SEXWAT  -3.037 1.123  0.007    SEXWAT  -2.256 0.918  0.014 
FEMPROP  0.886 2.110  0.675   FEMPROP  0.504 2.072  0.808 
APROP  0.570 2.607  0.827    APROP  2.057 2.416  0.395 
HIGH20  2.554 1.034  0.014   PPCAPITA  4.97E-06 2.80E-06  0.076 
LOW20  2.048 1.072  0.056          
AVGROUP  -8.424 2.987  0.005   AVGROUP  -6.623 2.675  0.013 
               
Dependent variable    PARTIC    Dependent variable    PARTIC 
Number of observations    63   Number of observations    63
Log likelihood function    -24.58865  Log likelihood function    -26.97617
Restricted log likelihood    -40.7581  Restricted log likelihood    -40.7581
Chi-squared  32.3389  Chi-squared    27.56386
Significance level    1.74E-04  Significance level    5.65E-04




b) Including also communities with zero price 
1) with income class dummy      2) with per capita income   
              
Variable  Coeff. Std.Err.  P-value    Variable  Coeff. Std.Err. P-value 
Constant  1.642 3.316  0.621    Constant  0.770 3.480  0.825 
HEADAGE  -0.035 0.019  0.069   HEADAGE  -0.034 0.019  0.074 
EDUW0  1.699 0.675  0.012    EDUW0  1.704 0.680  0.012 
EDUW2  3.981 1.388  0.004    EDUW2  3.960 1.386  0.004 
SEXWAT  -1.197 0.563  0.034    SEXWAT  -1.134 0.562  0.044 
FEMPROP  2.058 1.687  0.223   FEMPROP  1.983 1.666  0.234 
APROP  0.072 1.490  0.961    APROP  0.461 1.467  0.753 
HIGH20  0.979 0.647  0.131   PPCAPITA  5.06E-06 3.04E-06  0.096 
LOW20  0.184 0.729  0.801          
AVGROUP  -1.707 1.185  0.150   AVGROUP  -1.409 1.195  0.238 
ETHNI  1.053 1.163  0.365    ETHNI  0.737 1.075  0.493 
               
Dependent variable    PARTIC    Dependent variable    PARTIC 
Number of observations    96  Number of observations    96
Log likelihood function    -48.2863  Log likelihood function    -47.59716
Restricted log likelihood    -60.3887  Restricted log likelihood    -60.38865
Chi-squared  24.20479  Chi-squared  25.58298
Significance level    7.07E-03  Significance level    2.39E-03
% of cases predicted correctly  75.00%  % of cases predicted correctly  78.10%
 
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
We have examined access to, use of, and participation in decisions on improved water 
supply in the Volta basin of Ghana, one of the first countries to introduce a community-based 
approach to rural water supply on a large scale. Our results indicate that 71 percent of the 
households interviewed in the basin have access to improved water, which seems reasonably 
close to the CWSA’s target of 85 percent by the year 2009.  However, access does not imply that 
all households in these communities actually use the improved source. Our analysis shows that 43 
percent of households with access to an improved source prefer alternative, less safe sources as 
their main domestic water source. Moreover, even those households using improved sources 
typically supplement their water needs with other sources, even for drinking and cooking  
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purposes. This has potentially adverse health implications and points to the need to better 
understand household decision-making for domestic water use, which was the purpose of this 
paper.  
Our results indicate that quality perceptions play an important role in households’ choice 
of water source. Specifically, households that consider the unimproved source to be of bad 
quality are significantly more likely to choose the improved source as their main water source. 
Differences in quality perceptions across households can be due to either actual quality 
differences or to differences in awareness.  If the latter is the case, there is an important role for 
education and awareness building.  More research is therefore needed on the underlying causes of 
the variation in quality perceptions. 
Relative distances to improved and unimproved sources also matters to some extent as it 
translates into opportunity costs of time for reaching the source. Thus, the provision of more 
improved water sources to reduce distances is likely to increase households’ use of such sources. 
The effect of prices and income levels on households’ choice of water source differs 
according to the pricing system used. In particular, price matters where a per-unit price is 
charged. Under such a system, household behavior is sensitive to the price charged, regardless of 
income. Price and quality also have a significant impact on the quantity of improved water 
consumed in these communities. Where a flat rate is charged, income level plays a more 
important role than price. This is intuitive as the effective per-unit price charged in these 
communities tends to be low, but the one-time payment required can be problematic for poorer 
households, particularly in the context of imperfect credit markets. This points to the importance 
of choosing an appropriate pricing system to prevent exclusion of the poor. For example, a flat 
rate system allowing poor households to pay in installments may be useful to ensure that poorer 
households are reached.  
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Given that supply characteristics such as the location and pricing system affect household 
decisions to use the improved source, households may try to influence these characteristics in 
their favor during the community decision-making process for the improved source. Yet our 
results shows that less than 40 percent of the households interviewed participated in decisions on 
location or technology.  This raises the question of what determines whether a household 
participates or not. We argue that this decision, in principle, depends on three main factors: (i) the 
household’s bargaining power, i.e., how likely the household’s participation is to result in 
influencing supply characteristics in its favor, (ii) the potential benefits from such influence, e.g., 
the probability of actually using the improved source, and (iii) the cost of participation, i.e., 
mainly the opportunity cost of time. Our results indicate that bargaining power matters more than 
potential benefits, that is, bargaining power is important in Ghanaian communities. Moreover, 
contrary to the middle-class effect discussed elsewhere (Weinberger and Juetting 2002), we find 
what we call an extremes effect: the poorest, uneducated and the richest, highly educated 
segments of the community are more likely to participate in decision-making for improved 
domestic water supply than the middle class. The high attendance of the richer segments is 
consistent with the idea that bargaining power increases with income and education, while 
participation by the poor and uneducated may be demand-driven as these are specifically targeted 
by CWSP. Opportunity costs are likely to have less of an effect in the context studied here where 
the issue is one of participating in one or few meetings only, as compared to other studies 
discussing participation in regular groups meetings. Further research on other aspects of 
participation, for example, membership in WATSAN committees, which take additional 
decisions regarding domestic water supplies and meet more regularly, as well as for similar issues 
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